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RAILROADS AND URBAN RIVALRIES
IN ANTEBELLUM EASTERN VIRGINIA
by PETER C. STEWART '

THE recent controversy between Richmond and Norfolk over deep

the James indicates that urban rivalry in the state of Virginia is far f
dead. Such contests with roots extending far into Virginia's past reach
a peak in the three decades before the Civil War. Every major commu
in the Old Dominion took part, but the most serious rivalry involved a t
cornered struggle among Richmond, Norfolk, and Petersburg.

At the outset of the railroad era, eastern Virginia's chief comme
centers in population, resources, and wealth were Richmond, Norfolk
cluding neighboring Portsmouth), and Petersburg in that order. The
capital had edged ahead of the other two communities in the decade pr
ing the War of I 8I 2. The war actually helped Richmond's growth and
I820 its inhabitants numbered over i 2,000. Ten years later the popula

had increased by twenty-five percent and the city on the James endowed w

several flour mills, iron foundries, and tobacco manufactories enhanc

lead. The upper James River and its canal brought the produce of

interior to her wharves, while coastwise and ocean-going ships, althou
with difficulty, ascended the lower James to bear away Richmond's c

merce. Norfolk on the Elizabeth River near the entrance to Chesa

Bay lacked the resources necessary for manufacturing but did possess
of the finest harbors in the world. The onetime leading commercial t
of the state stagnated particularly during the second war with Great B
and the depressing twenties. Petersburg, located on the shallow Appom
River, obviously did not have the advantage of a commodious harbor,

$ Dr. Stewart is an associate professor of history at Old Dominion University, Norfolk, Vir
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the town did contain a number of cotton text

several tobacco concerns. Industrial develo
lagged behind that enjoyed in Richmond.
up for their poor location by making maxim
her residents proved more than a match fo
place in economic development.

These three communities all participated
roads in the state. Each railroad when pro
the economic growth of its sponsoring com

against the incursions of another. Such ob
intense rivalry.

The most bitter of these "wars" pitted the port of Norfolk against
the manufacturing center of Petersburg. Toward the end of the War of
I812 Norfolk merchants and North Carolina farmers happily witnessed
the completion of the Dismal Swamp Canal, which permitted lighters
and other small craft to bring the Old North State's lumber and agricultural
products to the Elizabeth River. Narrow and shallow, the canal posed no
threat to Petersburg, recently rebuilt after a disastrous fire and entering an

era of significant growth as a textile and tobacco-processing center. Unfortunately for relations between the two towns, the businessmen of Norfolk,

noting that they controlled only a small fraction of the total commerce of
their own state, tried to secure the tobacco and grain produced in considerable volume in the Roanoke Valley. This was possible because the Roanoke
River flows into Albemarle Sound, the southern terminus of the Dismal
Swamp Canal. Tobacco and grain from Southside Virginia, as well as
cotton from North Carolina, could, therefore, be carried by water all the

way to Norfolk. In December i 81 5 several men in an open boat carried a
barrel of mountain flour from Campbell County in Southside Virginia to
Norfolk. This act gave "pleasing evidence of the facilities which exist
towards opening a communication with the interior of the state through the

fertile parts of North Carolina."' However, several rapids in the Roanoke
River had to be eliminated if Norfolk was to secure a steady flow of goods
from the interior. Shortly after the voyage of the men from Campbell,

Norfolk merchants helped organize the Roanoke Navigation Company,
which gradually cleared the river for trade. Aware that the volume of com-

merce was bound to increase and that Roanoke River towns would be
employing larger vessels, the officers of the Dismal Swamp Canal Company
INorfolk American Beacon, December 14, 1815.
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immediately made plans to rebuild their waterway. By
had been completed. Norfolk, it appeared, had obtain
premacy in the Roanoke Valley.

The farmers in the Valley did not feel endangered by
at all for the appearance of the canal was to their adva
newspaper, the Roanoke Advocate, suggested in I830 th
upper Valley stop wagoning their tobacco to Petersb
cargoes to Norfolk. The editor pointed out that farmer
winter to ship their crops, but this was no longer nec
suggested that Valley folk could expect even further i
Petersburg would awake quickly "from her dreams of s
and Petersburg will then be fairly in competition, and o
good and ready markets, and take their choice."2

Petersburg residents had no intention of allowing No
commerce of the Roanoke Valley. It had long been "cus

upper towns as the jealous rivals of Norfolk and enemies of

and the attempted capture of the Roanoke commerce br
tion. In I 830 the General Assembly over the objection o
tion chartered the Petersburg Railroad Company. With
railroad south of Petersburg reached the Roanoke Rive
Carolina.

With the trade of the upper Roanoke about to shift b
the residents of Norfolk decided to build their own rai

merchants promoted the Tarborough Railroad, desig
Tar and Roanoke Rivers, thereby increasing trade, par
latter river. The Tarborough project, however, failed t

subscriptions. Most investors purchased stock in th

Roanoke Railroad Company which planned to reach We
lina. The road, claimed Thomas G. Broughton, Jr., the e
"would bid defiance to competition and insure us comm
produce of the upper Roanoke."4 Despite the import
stock sales were slow. Norfolk sought a variance in t
distributing aid whereby the state bought forty percen
after private interests pledged the other sixty percent
to allow any change in the procedure, which led the
that the Richmond and Petersburg interests proved too
2 Norfolk Herald, September i 3, 1830.
Ibid., June 27, 1829.
4Ibid., April 30, I832.
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We did flatter ourselves with the hope that the b
to have to say that Norfolk was indebted to the L

of liberality and justice, but we have been disa
it-completed it will be, in spite of you-a revolu

the people of this district in favor of the railroad

The Portsmouth and Roanoke Railroad
obstacles. Begun in I832 in the midst of a

pleted in I837 in a time of nationwide f

which followed kept receipts from transpo
route to Weldon was properly surveyed, s
high maintenance costs. Still, the venture m

direct confrontation with the Petersburg Rai

Financial statements of the two companie
firm was far better equipped to withstand

shorter length, the interior road collected
about three years before the Portsmouth r
a firm foundation before the rivalry comm

ceivably could catch up. After the first full y

railroad trailed its opponent by only $25,0

of the decade the seaboard line did wel
nearly $49,8oo to $59,140 in 1839 and fi

later. Petersburg, however, did even bette

able but in 1839 the piedmont road eam

twice the receipts of her rival. Up to this p

either party and the future looked bright for
pression.6

One significant factor giving Petersburg
ability to control freight traffic. The ori
had hoped to divert the flow of tobacco an
goal could never be fully realized, partially
sumed an increasing quantity of produce in
mond used even more. As Henry Bird, pre

viewed the situation it was "very evident that

not be benefitted by the competition-no
and Portsmouth for the tobacco is to go
r Norfolk Herald, March 1, 1833.

6 'Tolls Received," Portsmouth and Roanoke Railroa
Railroad Company, Board of Public Works, MSS., Virg
cited as BPW.
7 Letter, Bird to J. Brown, June x 8, x 842, Petersburg Railroad Company, BPW.

This content downloaded from 128.82.252.150 on Fri, 16 Dec 2016 20:03:11 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

Railroads and Urban Rivalries 7

is borne out by the fact his railroad, unlike most roads
income largely from freight-as high as sixty-five perc

I838, compared with less than thirty percent for th

cemented control over freight in the late i 83os by constru

westward which tapped the commerce of the Roanoke
Weldon. Survival of the Portsmouth railroad in the

i840s, therefore, depended on persuading more travelers to

Portsmouth officials realized that bridging the Roano
wvould give their railroad an edge on the Petersburg li

of the Wilmington and Weldon Railroad, chartered just
in North Carolina, preferred not to cross the Roanoke
other railroad. When the Weldon Bridge was complete
chants appeared to have out maneuvered their rivals. Bird complained
bitterly and tried, with the help of the Virginia Board of Public Works, to
rent use of the bridge. Negotiations failed. The Petersburg Company then
formed an alliance with two other Virginia railroads-the Richmond and

Petersburg and the Richmond, Fredericksburg and Potomac. The three
companies, commonly called the "inland" route, cut fares in half, hoping to
drive the Portsmouth Road out of business. The latter retaliated, reducing
fares and arranging for special through rates to Baltimore with the newly
created Baltimore and Norfolk Steam Packet Company (the Bay Line).
The rate war inflicted severe damage on the Petersburg Road. Bird complained to the state auditor in September I 842 that he could pay no dividend
to the state on its share of the stock because of the severity of the competition.
I must inform you that the efforts of the Portsmouth Company to divert our trade
from us continue as active as -ever. We no sooner lowered our rates of transportation
last summer than they reduced theirs below ours, and it is probable we shall have to
lower again.9

The special through ticket also tended to reduce revenue for the Petersburg
line. Bird estimated that the special arrangement gave his company $I.37
less per passenger than the local rate and meant that he suffered an annual
loss of between $I2,000 and $I 5,000.10
Although the rate war cut income for the inland road, the reduction was
even more severe for her rival. The seaboard line managed to hold her own
fairly well until the through ticket took effect in December I 842. Revenue
8 'Tolls Received," and "Statements" of the respective companies, BPW.
9 Letter, Bird to Brown, September x6, 1842, Petersburg Railroad Company, BPW.
IO Petersburg Intelligencer, March I 6, I 845.
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then slid approximately twenty-five perce
gained the upper hand. The cost of constr

also severely jeopardized the Portsmouth
company heavily in debt to some unsympathetic individuals. In I843
Francis Rives, secretly representing the Petersburg Company, acquired one
of these claims and immediately acted to close the road. Petersburg officials
even sent some of their workers to help tear up the Portsmouth tracks. Upon

learning of these events, Walter Gwynn, president of the Portsmouth concern, led another force to stop further assaults and repair the damage already

done. Following a comic chase scene and a bloodless encounter, the sheriff
of Northampton County, North Carolina, arrested Rives. Petersburg officials, of course, were annoyed, but saw eventual victory. The Petersburg
Intelligencer on March i6 predicted
that, as our state is a part owner in this concem, she will have too much regard for her
credit to remain much longer in a concern which will neither pay its debts, or surrender property for the payment of them, when she sees her liabilities are increasing.

We hesitate not to say that there is a moral obligation on the State either to have
business suspended or property sold.

The editor of the Herald responded that the comments from the Intelligencer were
well calculated to make false irnpressions.... The piece is marked by the same
cunning and concealment which have heretofore characterized the course of certain
individuals and corporations towards the Portsmouth Road. The article in the Intelligencer is but another small link in the chain of circumstances which goes to establish
the fact.11

The whcle Rives business was "openly denounced as a gunpowder plot."12
Despite the seriousness of the situation, the editorial ended on a rather defiant note. "In the meantime the Portsmouth Road will continue its operation."13 Anxiously awaiting news of Rives' trial in North Carolina, the
Herald prematurely reported that decisions in the lower courts against Rives

had been affirmed by the supreme court of the state, thwarting the "diabolical efforts of the Petersburg Company to break down its hated rival."'4

One can scarcely imagine the consternation in Hampton Roads when the
residents discovered that the North Carolina Supreme Court actually gave
" Norfolk Herald, March 1, 1845.
12 Ibid.
s Ibid.

14 Ibid., March 22, I845.
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Rives control in the Old North State. Rives quiclly moved to
on the North Carolina portion of the Portsmouth Road.

Prominent Norfolkians tried to persuade the Virginia Bo

Works to do something to save the road. Walter Gwynn hop

Public Works would assist against Rives. The state, he note

the road and he professed disbelief that "she can now be i

stroy it by the cold and selfish principle of dividend paying

businessman, writing a few months after the Rives affair

If Virginia gives up her Norfolk Railroad, . . . she relinquished to Bal
seaport and all her foreign commerce hereafter. Like North Carolina
content, or will perforce be compelled, to become tributary to other

fostering her seaport she would remain independent of all other marke

and domestic imports and exports.16

Despite such pleading, the Board of Public Works and the
bly, though sympathetic, remained aloof.

In at least one respect the state legislature of North Caro

lier. When Francis Rives petitioned that body for a charter

line from Weldon to Virginia, the North Carolinians noted

an agreement with Petersburg by which he received paym
line inactive. Obviously Rives was interested in obtaining

vent anyone else from starting another road to Portsmouth.

lative committee hearing brought out the fact that Rives

$2,500 quarterly as long as his road carried no person or p

years later a new company rebuilt the railway and once ag

enjoyed decent transportation with the Roanoke. Ironically

tors in the reappearance of this road was another urban r
involving Richmond and Petersburg.

The contest between these two fall-line towns though le
community pride was at times as vicious as the one betwe

Petersburg. The animosity reached a peak in I846 after

road had apparently been interred. As early as April intern

15 Twelfth Annual Report . . . of the Portsmouth and Roanoke Com

1844), p. 43.

6George Blow to BPW, June x, I846, Portsmouth and Roanoke Railroad
17 "Record of Proceedings and Evidence Taken and Had before the Joint
with the Investigation of the Conduct of Certain Railroad Companies, &c.,"

of Delegates of Virginia, Session 1846-47 (Richmond, 1846), pp. 89-92;
Legislative Documents (I846-47), PP. 4-5.
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advocates suggested the construction of a sh
the Appomattox River near the James.18

We have manufactures here which can and, if we o
would compete with those of any city in the Union. We have a real extensive and
miagnificent back country ready to pour into our laps the abundant treasures of its
labor and its thrift, if we but afford the opportunity of the retum, of a recompensing
gain. Give us but the nucleus here-the means of an untrammeled and frequent intercourse with the high seas and we can force the hidden treasures of unnumbered acres
and the "freighted tides" of distant waters to minister to our wealth and strength.19

Petersburg, one editor advised, should not be angry with Richmond but
should emulate her.
Richmond proposes to the country, not the country to Richmond. There is a public
spirit, an enterprise, a strengthening and a laudable desire for gain there. Argus-eyed,
active and ever prompt to make the very best of any and all projects to multiply the
wealth and resources of the city. So it should be with Petersburg and so it will be if
we are not mistaken.20

In spite of these efforts to keep local jealousy at a minimum, anti-Richmond sentiment began to creep into the canal campaign. One correspondent

noted that the real idea behind the project had become "to turn back the
trade that has found its way to Richmond or take away that which time im-

memorially she had enjoyed."'2' Petersburg, he submitted, wished to kill

Richmond's ports on the James-Port Walthall and Bermuda Hundredand capture the valley trade as well as the southern traffic. The truth was
that many residents of the Cockade City, distressed by Richmond's growth,

were concerned over talk of a railroad connecting the capital with Danville,
and were irritated that much of the commerce coming over their railroad

ended up in Richmond. After a vigorously supported beginning, the idea
of a ship canal fell by the wayside and Petersburgers refocused attention on
their railroads.

The "inner route" alliance had been uneasy at best. Even before it had
been arranged, Bird complained about being caught between "the Portsmoutli Company on the one hand and those who ought to be our friends
(the Richmond and Fredericksburg Company) on the other." He bragged
that once he paid for some iron to rebuild his facility he could "face them
'8Petersburg Republican, April I3, I 846.
19 Ibid., July I o, I 846.
20 Ibid.

21 Ibid., July 17, 1846.
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both."22 When the Portsmouth road closed a few years l
terminated his arrangement with the other two lines. He
with James River steamboat interests to take passengers t
there to board Bay steamers going to Baltimore. At the same

started to revamp the publicly owned City Point Railroad
would have quick passage to the James River.

Moncure and Wirt Robinson, presidents of the other two
by building a branch line from the tracks of the Richmon
to Port Walthall located just north of City Point on the

"upper" route railways then organized a steamboat comp

Norfolk and Port Walthall Association. According to testim

before a special legislative committee, the railroads not on

boats a certain amount of money based on the passenger t

roads, but even helped in financing the construction of the s

selves though the company charters forbade stock purch

porations. Both presidents defended their actions on the g

"an important protection to the companies north of Peter

injury with which they have been threatened."23 The edit

burg Intelligencer, J. W. Syme, was not particularly receptiv
to make Port Walthall a major riverport.

The proprietors of this famous new line which is to connect the
"most do congregate"-but which is now sonorously called "Por

the City of Norfolk, state in the outset that their object is "to exped

possible between Petersburg and Richmond and Norfolk," and t
not stop for way travel. Why, what a benevolent and disinterest
one is! They don't care to make money! Not they. As a member
once said, they are "above the filthy lucre of the gain." They would
pure hands with the "dirty dross." They go entirely for the goo
their association should be called "The Cat Hole Pro Bono Publico

Syme correctly pointed out that the northern roads were p

to lose money on the Port Walthall proposition as long a

people could be driven from the James River. Noting tha

son was well known as the originator of "the new way of

to his road by drawing business from it," the Petersbur

22Ltter, Bird to J. Brown, September io, 1842, Petersburg Railroad C
23Board of Public Works, Annual Report (1846), P. 448.

24Editorial, Petersburg Intelligencer, April i I, I846, as quoted in "Reco
Evidence Taken and Had before the Joint Committee Charged with th
Conduct of Certain Railroad Companies," Journal of House of Delegates (
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defeat for the scheme. "He can as easily dam u
from running on it,"25 Syme declared.

Stubbornness and personal dislike governed t
Robinson. In private Robinson called Bird "on
and the latter complained about Robinson's "b
thought Bird's "shortsighted policy" would d
below what they had been when the Portsmou
Progress of the Danville-Richmond road and

mouth Railroad, Robinson figured, endangered
possibility that Bird might join with Wilmington's railroad in a huge
through ticket from Charleston to Baltimore did not alarm Robinson for he
considered Bird too foolish to take advantage of such a scheme and because

he thought his own railway relied more on local traffic.30 He did fear "a
design in Petersburg . . . to throw the line [the Richmond and Petersburg]
into confusion."3" The leader of the "upper route" had to be on his toes to
keep the state government at least neutral in the fight and there was undoubtedly either pressure or money applied in the right places to prevent the

state from interceding. Both sides aired their views in the legislative halls
as part of an investigation of the Port Walthall association at the request of
Robert Mayo, the operator of the James River steamboat line allied with
Bird's railroad.32

While the controversy between Bird and Robinson raged, Petersburgers
sought to add another arrow to their quiver. Syme, aware that a loose alliance between Richmond and Lynchburg was coming apart, called for the
construction of a new railroad joining the latter town with Petersburg.

Lynchburg had benefitted to some extent from its location on the James
River, but its citizens realized that the far western trade offered a bright
future. In the fall of I847 the town's residents backed the idea of a road
called the "Richmond and Ohio," which would meet the James River at
Lynchburg. Delegates from Lynchburg and several western counties meeting at Wytheville also urged a branch road through southwestern Virginia
25 Editorial, June 23, 1846, Petersburg, Intelligencer, p. 39.

26Letter, Moncure Robinson to Edwin Robinson, July I, I847, Moncure Robinson Papers,
College of William and Mary Library.

27Letter, Bird to Brown, April 7, 1847, Petersburg Railroad Company, BPW.
28 Letter, M. Robinson to E. Robinson, June 21, 1847, Robinson Papers.
29 Ibid., August 3', 1847.
so Ibid., February 8, I848.
31 Ibid., January 9, I 848.

32 "Record of Proceedings and Evidence Taken and Had before the ... Joint Committee . .
Journal of House of Delegates ( 846).
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to the Tennessee border. A minority at this convention want

Danville Road, but a strong Lynchburg delegation defeated
Lynchburg argued with both Richmond and Danville, Syme
thought that Petersburg should erect a line to a point 40 m
there joining two other roads coming from Danville and Ly
Lynchburg Virginian stated that Syme's proposal "seems
some fluttering in Richmond. It is a subject of some interes
proposal had no direct bearing on the outcome of the dispu
north-south railroads, but in the next decade Petersburg was

vantage of her location for east-west traffic to wrest commerc

capital.
In the struggle over the north-south traffic the "Bay Company" proved to

be the key to victory. After the failure of the Portsmouth road, the steamboat company turned to the James River boats for travelers. In the spring of

I 847 Robinson considered preventing an alliance between the Bay line and
the Petersburg Railroad Company one of his major policies.34 A year later,
with the City Point Railroad rebuilt, which greatly strengthened Bird's
hand, Robinson feared the Petersburg organization might somehow take
prospective "upper route" passengers. In the event this occurred Robinson
threatened to put "a line of boats in the Bay in connection with the revised
Portsmouth Road."35 In other words the principal owner of the R. F. & P.
was willing to sacrifice his own traffic to destroy Bird's. Actually Bird never
did cement an alliance with the Bay line. In the summer of I 846 the board
of the Petersburg Company resolved to "permit no agents either of the Bay

Company or the Rail Roads north of Petersburg" to have free passes or
use any company facilities to sell tickets.36 Bird argued that the real culprits

were the northern Virginia railroads which kept rates high. Lowering rates,

he suggested, would eliminate competition from the James River boats. By
providing steamboat service down the James River, both companies increased
the importance of Chesapeake Bay. In I 847 Bird estimated that over half
the passengers took the Bay route.37

In addition to posing a threat as part of an alliance, the Bay line also could

endanger all Virginia "fall line" railways by working for the revival of the

Portsmouth road, their old ally. When a projected Charleston to New York
33Lynchburg Virginian, November 25, 1848.
34Letter, M. Robinson to E. Robinson, March 31, 1847, Robinson Papers.
i5Ibid., February 8, 1848.
86 etter, Bird to Brown, July 7, I846, Petersburg Railroad Company, BPW.
371bid., August I9, 1847.
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steamship line panicked North Carolina, V
vania interests into considering through t
stubbornly refused to work with the Ches
that only the Bay company was interested
road. Excluding the Bay people from compe
mouth Road again.8

Apparently unknown to Bird, forces wer
thinking of his hated rival. As early as Oc
William Smith suggested the possibility of
the old Portsmouth Road and at the same t
its demise. The governor was interested pri
of the stock failure which he figured cost

$I,000,000 indirectly when the original ro
formation of one company including the ol
new company was to be heavily funded by
he hoped, would eliminate ruinous competition since the inland roads
"would have no motive to control the trade or travel to any particular
route."3 Governor Smith failed to realize that the nature of the rivalry had
radically changed since the death of the Portsmouth line. His ideas eventually bore fruit but not in the manner he visualized.
Northern capitalists were the first to take steps to revise the road to
Hampton Roads. Their motives are suspect. According to a contemporary
newspaper the whole scheme was preposterous, being devised solely for
quick resale at a good profit. Actually the "Henshaw" interests who got control did considerable work, but they resold with a substantial number of
shares going to a most unusual party-the Chesapeake Bay Line. Meanwhile that company had experienced a major upheaval among its stock-

holders. Moncure Robinson of the R. F. & P. along with several of his
friends and associates had taken over the Steamboat Company apparently to

help fight the Petersburg line. The enterprise was too valuable to destroy
and its annihilation would only permit someone else to start a similar line.
In its first full year of operation with Robinson as a prominent stockholder,

the line earned a fourteen percent dividend, which led him to conclude that

it needed "no other business than that of Norfolk and Portsmouth to support it.""O This statement indicates a willingness to withdraw the Bay line
88 Letter, Bird to Brown, September 23, I847, Petersburg Railroad Company, BPW.
389Leter, William Smith to John Cocke, October 30, I846, Seaboard and Roanoke Railroad
Conpany, BPW.

40 Letter, M. Robinson to E. Robinson, March 24, 1849, Robinson Papers.

This content downloaded from 128.82.252.150 on Fri, 16 Dec 2016 20:03:11 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

Railroads and Urban Rivalries 1 5

as an instrument in the fight against Petersburg. In the ye
however, Robinson bought into the Seaboard and Roanoke R
came to see the real value of coastal shipping and reduced h
with the Richmond railroads. For a few years he sat on the
sponse to a request that he stop the creation of a through t
Petersburg, Norfolk and Baltimore he refused but pointed out

myself and my friends in the Bay line are pecuniarily more interested

the Bay line than in the upper route . . . but whilst pecuniarily mo
travel going by the Bay line than the upper route, our feelings (from

into the Upper route and that we have other friends exclusively th
interested in the success of the upper route than the Seaboard and Roanoke railroad
and Bay line.41

In i86o Robinson gave further evidence of his switch when he placed one
of his sons in the Seaboard office in Portsmouth thus indicating a preference
for the coastal project.
By the early I 85os Richmond had temporarily outwitted her rivals. Peters-

burg was forced to send most of her goods and passengers on to Richmond
while Norfolk's steamboat and railroad interests were under the control of
Richmond railroad men. But both Petersburg and Norfolk had options left.
They could aid each other in the fight against Richmond.

The long standing feud between Norfolk and Richmond started well before the introduction of the railroads which sparked ill feeling between Nor-

folk and Petersburg. Early conflicts between the capital and the coast centered on the banking question. At the beginning of the nineteenth century
the state government authorized the establishment of a branch banking system with a parent bank in Richmond and branches located in other Virginia
towns. Many years later when Norfolk requested a bank of its own, the
local editor pointed out that when Norfolk first applied for its own inde-

pendent bank charter in I803, Richmond "perhaps a little jealous of the
prosperity of her neighbor" acquired control of the bank.42 In I 812 Norfolk's

citizens tried once more only to be blocked again. In the mid-i 83os Norfolk

pressed her claims for an independent institution. Finally in 1837 as part
of a general banking reform Norfolk obtained the parent bank of a new
system with branches in Richmond and Petersburg. The people of Norfolk,

said the editor, owed "a debt of gratitude to the Legislature of I836-37
which has broken the chain which for more than fifty years has held her
41Letter (copy), November I 5, I 858, Robinson Papers.
42 Herald, April 14, 1837.
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[Norfolk] in commercial bondage and paralized
noting that Petersburg still did not possess a
town need not worry for Norfolk would not "a
burg as Richmond did to Norfolk."43

Richmond's failure to support federal allocat
Canal Company in the mid i 82os gave Norfol
capital. Actually the state legislature, which h
Thomas Ritchie, editor of the Richmond Enqui
rural central Virginia, were the culprits. These
congressional delegation were on record oppos
at federal expense, which also meant voting aga
ton Roads.
The coming of the railroad greatly intensified ill will between Norfolk
and Richmond. Residents of Norfolk tended to blame Richmond more than
Petersburg for what happened to the Portsmouth Railroad. When the legislature refused to change the usual procedure in purchasing stock in internal
improvement companies, the Norfolk newspaper understood Petersburg's
opposition, but Richmond's position, it said, "could be stimulated by nothing
but a deep-rooted jealousy of and hostility to the rise of Norfolk since the
new railroad could not possibly harm Richmond but might help Norfolk.""
The Elizabeth River communities, however, were guilty of the same kind
of opposition. Richmond was vitally interested in the construction of the
James River Canal which was supposed to tap the far western trade for Virginia. While coastal inhabitants did not oppose a charter or state aid for the

project, they objected to any special considerations. Ritchie tried to convince seaboarders that the James River project would help develop Norfolk
as a seaport since all goods flowed through Hampton Roads. He urged Norfolk and Portsmouth not to worry about the "comparatively insignificant
Roanoke scheme."45 Perhaps because Richmond often exported more to
foreign ports in the I 83 as than any other community in the state, very few
flatlanders took Ritchie's suggestion seriously.

Richmond, of course, participated only indirectly in the wreck of the
Portsmouth Road but coastal residents tended to blame the state government

located in Richmond for what happened. There seemed to be a sinister
"metropolitan influence" at work to block the rise of the port of Norfolk.
Trivial incidents led to inflammatory statements. On one occasion when a
43Herald, April 14, I837.
441bid., March I, 1833.
4- Quoted in Herald, May I9, 1831.
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seaboard newspaper editor felt his community had been n
committee report, he urged outright secession from Vi

"only alternative seemed to be revolution."'46 Another edi

unimportant matter stated that "there is a point beyon
ceases to be a virtue." If conditions failed to improve, th
our representatives in that body [the General Assembly] will return home, and our
people take prompt and decided steps to release themselves from bondage by annexing
the city, come what may, to North Carolina-who would at least treat us with decent
and common justice.47

But in addition to its doubtful legality, secession could not improve Norfolk's situation and the move to withdraw from Virginia failed to carry.

One of the real problems causing dissension in eastern Virginia was the
attitude in the capital. Richmond newspapers rarely mentioned the rebellious views in Hampton Roads. According to this view local rivalry should
be snuffed out for the welfare of the entire state in the face of Northern
threats. The real problem was that most Richmonders somehow assumed
that their city should be the economic hub of the state. It was perfectly
natural, somehow, that Virginia's biggest port was well over one hundred
miles inland. They could not understand why Petersburg and Norfolk
failed to join them in building up the capital's commerce to help defend Virginia against the enroachments of Baltimore and New York. As the sectional conflict grew Richmond came to see itself as the state's first line of
defense.
Virginia should have and might have a centre of intellect at her University, a centre of
Fashion at her mineral springs, and a centre of capital, trade, and manufactures at
Richmond. . . . It is now a well established theory in political economy that the
centre of trade robs the extremities, to enrich the country round them. They rob those
extremities of their labor, their skill, their thoughts, their intellect, their fashions, their
language, their customs, their national identity and independence as well as of their
wealth.48

In making such comments the Richmond editor obviously had Northern
cities in mind, but he failed to realize that in Virginia, Petersburg and Nor-

folk would be considered "extremities" if Richmond remained the hub. It
would have been impossible, however, for such a writer to have been totally
unaware of the existence of urban jealousies, for just a short time before he
46Weekly Southern Argus, February i i, IS5 I5.

47Herald, FebruarY 3, i852..
48 Richmond Enquirer, (semi-weekly) March 7, I856.
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published the above statement, Richmond suf

the hands of its two primary antagonists-Norfolk and Petersburg.
In the decade before the Civil War, Virginia poured millions of dollars
into an attempt to build up her economic resources. Not only did the James
River Canal project continue to receive financial support, but the state began

to purchase as much as sixty percent of the stock in a number of railroads,
despite the fact that these companies competed with each other and with the

canal. The Richmond-oriented Virginia Central Railroad with its western
terminal beyond the Blue Ridge mountains opened not only the Valley of
Virginia, but potentially via the Covington Railroad, the Ohio Valley as
well. In the same period the state chartered three railroads which together
would cross southern Virginia reaching Tennessee's railroads to give Petersburg and Norfolk rail connection with the Mississippi River. Norfolk was
particularly interested in a railroad to Petersburg, but the whole project also
depended on the successful construction of the Southside Road from Petersburg to Lynchburg and the completion of the Virginia and Tennessee which
covered the remaining distance to the state border.

An internal improvements convention held in Norfolk in I854 demonstrates how Richmond's position had deteriorated. The lone Richmond
delegate James Lyons "defended Richmond from the charge of inhospitableness and want of liberality." He "appealed to the citizens of Norfolk not to
take part against the north side."49 He agreed that the southern roads should

be built, but objected to the unusual gauges used. The Richmond road used
the standard 4 feet 8? inch gauge, but the southern roads were all wide
gauge, which exceeded 5 feet. Obviously the difference in gauge hindered
any effort by Richmond to draw traffic off the southwestern roads. At the

same time the southern contingent at the convention called for the wide
gauge for the new Covington Road so that its freight could not be carried

off to Baltimore. The southern delegation refused to budge except to say
that the state should aid railroads both north and south of the James equally

and that the state should broaden the gauge of the Central Railroad to conform to those south of the James. Failing to prevent passage of anti-Richmond resolutions, two representatives from the capital asked not to be "con-

sidered . . . in the deliberations of the convention."50 Lyons, who stayed
despite the resolves, was undoubtedly distressed at the outcome.
Earlier in the year a Richmond dominated internal improvements conven49Richmond Enquirer, November 14, 1854.
50 Ibid.
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tion had been held at White Sulphur Springs. Althoug
representatives attended the meeting, no Norfolk del
gathering listened to Richard Morris, a Richmonder,
attempt to build up Norfolk. "To do this," he said, "o
claims are to be set aside-the interests of other secti
regarded."'" Seeking to calm troubled waters, Joseph
gate, stressed the value of the Covington route. To d
businessmen, he pointed out that certain branch roads

Norfolk to share in the trans-mountain commerce, would

capital. Segar also presented himself as a friend of N
railroads even with branch lines, he predicted would
shipments. Heavy freight charges would keep the Ja
premium. In addition Petersburg planned to draw the
Point, thus forcing it down the James River anyway.
superior harbor facilities, she was bound eventually to
tion of the western freight.52

The capital, though, was not completely cut off from

ginia Central continued to carry goods produced in t
in the not too distant future the far greater resourc
might come to the James. Since their own river lack

began to build a railway to Eltham (West Point) to rea
York River. Norfolk tried to check Richmond's advan
diverting the traffic of the Virginia Central to Peters

be done about the York River port except to complain
the knowledge that Eltham was not Richmond.

The attempt to keep future traffic from Richmond c

stir, for Richmonders deeply resented the plan which
an already existing traffic. A Norfolk editor dreamed

a railroad from Charlottesville to Petersburg thus permit

produce to come to Norfolk once the Norfolk-Petersbu

pleted. A contributor to the Weekly Southern Argus
saying, "If ever the Covington is built, Norfolk thro

burg and Charlottesville), will be its eastern termina
such a road did not ask for state aid because such a re

51Proceedings of the Internal Improvements Convention Held at W
the 24, 25 and 26 August, x854 . . . (Richmond, I855), p. 3.

52 Speech of Joseph Segar Esq. of Elizabeth City County on the Co
Delivered Before the White Sulphur Springs Convention August z5,
53 Weekly Southern Argus, January I7, I856.
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the possibility of obtaining a charter. The opt

paper believed that enough capital would be a
Road had been built.

Be of good cheer men of Norfolk! The hope so long d

West is with us. Western members say, "Well, if w

Norfolk is the spot. We must concentrate on Norfolk

The proverbial monkey wrench appeared, ho

lature refused even to charter the Petersburg
editor of the Argus was furious.

Are Senators insane? Have they determined that (a
line shall be drawn through the State of Virginia,
Norfolk?-that Norfolk should be kept in perpetua

the privileges of crossing it and tapping the improvem

to Richmond, Alexandria and all places north of it

He strongly suggested that Norfolk and other
aid any other state projects as long as the "on

plundered by taxation without participation!
dents considered the prospects of seceding fro
Carolina. But by this time another kind of se
the central question of the age and sectional d
state issues off the stage.

There can be little doubt that urban rivalry
in the history of Virginia's railroads, but it is
controversies from other factors. For examp

Norfolk banded together the railroad fights to
James River acting as a dividing line. Also, it is

mine where pecuniary motives stop and com
for profit undoubtedly prompted investment
ate financial reward was not expected from s
papers stressed stock purchases as a patriotic
participate. There is much evidence to indica
fore individual gain. The subscriber lists for
Railroad show ownership widely dispersed. In
of the private stockholders owned ten shares
holders only 26 owned more than 20 shares.
64Weekly Southern Argus, January 17, 1856.
66 Ibid., March Io, I 856.
56 Ibid.
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were the state and local governments with the state's sh

percent of the total while the Borough of Norfolk and t
mouth as a result of public meetings held 2,000 and 2,5
tively. The situation was much the same in Petersburg's case. In I832
with 228 private holders, 39 owned but one share and only a small number
controlled more than ten. The state held its usual percentage and the Corporation of Petersburg owned nearly twelve percent. A few years later some
Philadelphians bought into the company, but they retained only a small
portion of the total number of shares in private hands. Stock lists of the
R. F. & P. reveal a similar pattern.57

Merchants and other businessmen probably used an urban rivalry smoke
screen to enlarge their operations. Railroad managers especially were known
to employ such tactics. Robinson knew the value of community pride. In a
fight to retain a favorable mail contract with the federal government against

Petersburg's attempt to take it away, the leader of the "upper route" called
on his brother "to keep the press and people of Richmond as united as possi-

ble in our behalf.""' As trained engineers these men moved around a good
deal. Walter Gwynn, onetime president of the Portsmouth line, later
served in a similar capacity with the James River and Kanawha Canal Company. Moncure Robinson started as a civil engineer with the Petersburg
Company and had investments in many important railroads in the state. He
lived in Philadelphia when urban rivalry reached a peak. As has been
pointed out, Robinson switched allegiances just before the Civil War, but
this move did not change his basic technique for one finds him in i 86o
cautioning his son to do nothing to irritate the citizens of Portsmouth who
were doubtlessly a little miffed because their railroad was in the hands of
their former enemies.59

What influence did local rivalry have on the economic development of
the communities concerned? If population growth is the principal barometer, Richmond won for by i 86o her population excluding her suburbs exceeded 37,000 while Petersburg and Norfolk had failed to develop as
rapidly. The capital more than doubled Norfolk's rate of growth in the
thirty years after the advent of the railroad. Hampton Roads was saved
from stagnation largely because of the growth of the federally owned Gos-

port Shipyard whose expansion allowed Portsmouth to develop rapidly.
57Stockholder Rerts of the various companies may be found interspersed through each com-

pany's Board of Publc Works MSS.

8e Utter, M. Robinson to E. Robinson, December 30, 1847, Robinson Papers.
59 Lette, M. Robinson to John Robinson, FebruarY 3, I 86o Robinson Papers.
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Petersburg fared a little better than Norfolk

pace with the James River city.' Since Richmond was already moving
forward before the coming of the railroads, it may be concluded that the
presence of these facilities merely accentuated a trend already underway.
In this period, however, railroads played generally a defensive role. Had
Richmond, for instance, not built her roads she would have suffered. And if
Petersburg had failed to make rail connections to the Roanoke, she would
probably have ceased to exist as a major economic center.

After the Civil War Norfolk's connection with rail lines west and south
gave her dominion over a large portion of the nation's cotton commerce.
The larger ships of the postwar era rarely ascended the James to Richmond

or even the York to West Point. Richmond, like Petersburg, had to place
more emphasis on industrial development to maintain her population. But
long after the war, these urban quarrels, though marked with less bitterness,

occasionally reappeared. The antebellum rivalries left an enduring legacy.

60 United States Census, Population of the United States in 186o from the Original Returns
of the Eighth Census (Washington, 1864), p. 519.
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